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HOW MISINFORMATION
SPREADS THROUGH TWITTER
Mary Blankenship
University of Nevada, Las Vegas

ABSTRACT
While living in the age of information, an inherent drawback to such high exposure to content
lends itself to the precarious rise of misinformation. Whether it is called “alternative facts,”
“fake news,” or just incorrect information, because of its pervasiveness in nearly every political
and policy discussion, the spread of misinformation is seen as one of the greatest challenges to
overcome in the 21st century. 1 As new technologies emerge, a major piece of both content
creation and the perpetuation of misinformation are social media platforms like Twitter,
Facebook, and YouTube. As news events emerge, whether be a pandemic, a mass shooting, or
an election campaign, it is difficult to divulge the facts from fiction when so many different
“facts” appear. This study looks at 14,545,945 tweets generated in the wake of the 1 October
mass shooting and its second anniversary to identify how much of the public response is fogged
by information pollution, to identify what kind of misinformation is spread and how it spreads
on Twitter and news coverage.
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Gray, R. (1 March 2017). Lies, propaganda and fake news: A challenge for our age. BBC. Retrieved from
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INTRODUCTION
People are increasingly seeing the world through the lens of social media, particularly now, with
the stay-at-home measures imposed to mitigate the spread of the COVID-19 pandemic and
people’s contact to the outside world resorting to being mostly, if not entirely, online. More
than 2.4 billion people use social media (about one third of the world’s population), with
roughly 330 million people using Twitter as of 2019 (Ortiz-Ospina, 2019). The constant liveupdating, 280 character microblogging platform that is Twitter lets a person anywhere in the
world with internet connection instantly find entertainment2, catch the news, share their
opinions, and pass information along – whether that information is correct or not. As events in
this world unfold, from local to international levels, the reactions and updates from people
emerge just as fast. An example of this can be seen with a recent interview of the Mayor of Las
Vegas on CNN that garnered over 320,000 tweets from all over the world in the scope of just
five days (Blankenship et al., 2020).
Never has the interconnectedness of the world been more apparent and while social media
does have a profound positive impact, issues emerge with how the technology is utilized. After
the tragedy of the 1 October massacre, the Las Vegas community was brought closer together
with messages of support and the rallying cry of #vegasstrong that now defines the
metropolitan area (Barrie, 2019). At the same time, more malevolent interactions of
accusations, rumors, conspiracies were initiated and continue to persist, fogging the public
discourse and taking over the larger policy issues at hand.
One of the greatest challenges facing the country and the world today is overcoming the
information pollution that comes in a variety of forms, including mis- and dis-information.
Although these disorders have been present throughout the ages, the ability to hide or
fabricate your identity online while reaching millions of people is escalating the harmful
ramifications possible. As Abraham Lincoln addressed in a speech, “our government rests in
public opinion. Whoever can change public opinion, can change the government, practically just
so much. Public opinion, on any subject, always has a ‘central idea,’ from which all its minor
thoughts radiate.” The 2016 Presidential election highlighted the vast extent of information
manipulation that took place with the rise of “fake news,” content meant to prey on the
ignorance and emotional responses that is inherent to every human. By the end of that election
cycle, false content ended up accumulating more engagement (likes, shares, comments) than
mainstream, more factually reliable news (Silverman, 2017). The true extent of the impact that
incorrect information has on our decision making is not well known but a study conducted by
the National Bureau of Economic Research found that the continuing coverage and rapid
spread of information by Twitter bots alone may have contributed about 3.23% of vote the
2

Depends on what you consider entertainment to be
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Donald Trump (Smialek, 2018). The rest of this paper is going to go through the bare bones of
what misinformation is and will elaborate the pivotal role that social media outlets play in its
spread.
The diffusion of (mis)information is a nuanced subject and to uncover some of its complexities,
the following elements are going to be looked at in detail: what kind of misinformation about
the 1 October mass shooting spread and how lasting is the impact, if the misinformation is
perpetuated by bots or humans, what kind of motivation could be behind the message and its
intended audience, if the message has long term ramifications, and whether the message is
supported or corrected by those who engage in the conversation.

WHAT IS MISINFORMATION?
The term “information pollution” can encapsulate a wide variety of incorrect information that is
perpetuated online. This paper utilizes a framework developed and published with the Council
of Europe called Information Disorder, which outlines the different phases, elements, and
players contributing to this phenomena. Three different categories of information pollution can
be separated into the following categories: misinformation, disinformation, malinformation.
• Misinformation: occurs when false information is shared with no intent to harm
• Disinformation: occurs when false information is shared with the intent to harm
• Malinformation: occurs when genuine information is shared with the intent to harm,
d
e.g. leaks

Figure 1: Shows a Venn diagram (modified from the Information Disorder report) that categorizes the
different forms of information pollution that typically occur.
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The three categories differ primarily in their intent to harm and the level of inaccuracy but the
extent of information that can disseminate and its potential to impose harm can be equally as
severe. In this study, since the intent to harm is difficult to discern, the incorrect information
that is spread will all be placed under the blanket label of “misinformation.” There are various
types of information disorders that can pervade from fabricated and manipulated content to
more nuanced misinterpretation and false connection of content (Warle and Derakhshan,
2017). Information disorder can also be perpetuated not only through text and stories but also
though images, audio, and video. With the development of “deep-fakes” that can take
authentic sources and manipulate it into fake information and because of how realistic these
deep-fakes can appear, determining what is real is even a greater challenge for governments
and citizens (Meserole and Polyakova, 2018).
The diffusion of information pollution can be seen through three different elements of the
agent, the message, and the interpreter. As outlined in Table 1 below, the tale of
misinformation begins with the “Agent” that creates the falsified information for whatever
motivation and diffused by the “Message” and the “Interpreter.”
Table 1: Description of information pollution elements
Element

Description

The Agent

Creates misinformation

The Message

What is communicated by
the Agent and what is
distributed

The Interpreter

Audience of the message

Characteristics of Element
 Can be an official or unofficial actor
 Can be part of group or done individually
 Can have different motives (including
political or financial)
 Can use automated technology
 Can be illegal
 Can create long-term impact
 Accuracy can be difficult to discern
 Can per perpetuated through a variety of
mediums (news, videos, audio, etc.)
 Message can be perpetuated or evolve
with how different demographic groups
interpret the information

The vast combination of possible misinformation and the actors that spread and interpret the
message can result in a never ending cycle of information pollution. Once a false message is
out, it is easy for it to diffuse and get picked up in news coverage and publications that then get
referenced back in social media posts, continuing the cycle. A message that is successful at
gaining traction typically contains content that perpetuates feelings of superiority, anger, or
fear against another group.
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Role of social media in the spread of misinformation
News companies and social media have a symbiotic relationship, as most media outlets now
have a cross-platform approach to deliver their coverage that also includes social media
channels. Meanwhile, the social media companies have incorporated separate tabs within their
platform that only focus on the news or give “live” updates to trending events. Even traditional
forms of journalism like newspapers and TV coverage increasingly utilize social media posts
found on these platforms as their supporting evidence or as the entire story itself. The practical
reason behind this utilization is that sharing news articles on social media outlets increases the
lifespan of that those articles have to mass exposure – from the media lifespan of 2.6 days
without any media sharing to 3.2 days when also shared as a post (Carr, 2015). For Twitter
alone, the lifespan of an article is typically 2.5 days or 10-72 hours.
Twitter is a platform that is generally most news-focused than the others with its content and is
the third most popular social media outlet – behind Facebook and YouTube – to deliver news to
its users (Shearer and Matsa, 2018). About two-thirds of Americans at least occasionally got
their news on social media in 2018, even though more than half of social media consumers
think that the news they see is inaccurate (Shearer and Matsa, 2018). The nature of information
sharing and receiving has fundamentally changed in a short period of time since it has become
so easy to share the information and we do not know how to correctly deal with it.

BACKGROUND ON 1 OCTOBER
As mass shootings are becoming a marker of American life, on October 1st 2017, Las Vegas
joined an ever-increasing list of communities that suffered similar tragedies. Stephen Paddock
opened fire from his hotel window at Mandalay Bay on a crowd of 22,000 concert-goers at the
91 Route Harvest Festival, killing 58 and injuring more than 850 people (Corcoran et al., 2019).
This was the largest mass casualty shooting in the history of the United States. It began at 10:05
pm with Paddock firing with assault rifles (24 in total) he had snuck into this hotel room in the
days before and ended at about 10:15pm with his suicide before the SWAT team could break
into his room (Corcoran et al., 2019). The first public account of the shooting came from a
tweet about ten minutes after the first shots began. Twitter remained a crucial element in the
communications of the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department (LVMPD) throughout the
emergency and the investigation that followed.
Chaos and confusion engulfed the scene immediately, and just as quickly people took to their
social media accounts to warn others of danger or send their thoughts and prayer, fiery debate
also emerged with accusations of what might have happened at the scene. The shooter left no
note or manifesto behind, not that such a vile act should even be attempted to be given a
logical reason, but the absence of any affiliations or motivations has resorted to insufficient
guessing about the shooter and the motives behind the act. This is shown by the public
discussions that prevailed on social media after the shooting, and the claims that were most
popular attempted to make up for the void.
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Popular claims concerning the shootings
Although there was a huge variety in the accusations, conspiracies, and falsehoods that were
spread online concerning the shooting, the following section outlines some of the main
misinformation topics that were spread and are compared to the conclusions found in the
official LVMPD and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) report published along with other
sources.
There were multiple shooters:
This is one of the earliest incorrect pieces of information that was spread. Partly because the
initial alerts from the police department did not know how many active shooters there were.
However, the claims did not stop even after police found Paddock to be the only shooter.
→ One of the findings of the official investigation concluded that, “Paddock acted alone.
Despite early reports of multiple shooters in different locations, no evidence exists to
substantiate any of those reports,” (LVMPD, 2018).
ISIS was responsible for shooting:
Immediately following the shooting, ISIS claimed responsibility for it and stated that the shooter
was a “soldier of the Islamic State,” without providing any evidence (Smith, 2017).
→ No evidence was provided by ISIS to the shooter’s connection to it, the report also states
that, “there was no evidence of radicalization or ideology to support any theory that Paddock
supported or followed any hate group or any domestic or foreign terrorist organization,”
(LVMPD, 2018).
Shooter was a Muslim or converted to Islam:
This was often coupled with the ISIS claim and that the shooter had recently converted to Islam
and even traveled to the Middle East to be trained by the terrorist organization.
→ Although the shooter did travel to the Middle East on a cruise, there is no evidence of
connection to Islamic State. Again, the “investigators could not link Paddock to any specific
ideology,” and according to his girlfriend, “Paddock was not a religious person.” (LVMPD, 2018).
“Going to die” warning:
This claim suggested that the girlfriend of the shooter, Marilou Danley, was at the concert
venue and announced to people by her that they were “all going to die tonight” before the
shooting occurred.
→ Danley was out of the country when the shooting took place and did not get back to the
United States until October 4th, 2017 (LVMPD, 2018).
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Shooter’s identity:
Users identified the wrong people as the shooter, most notably Geary Danley, who has the
same last name as the girlfriend of the gunman, Marilou Danley. Other false claims include that
shooter was a 32 year-old Sam Hyde and had adopted a new name of Samir Al-Hajeed.
→ Shooter was Stephen Paddock and at no point went under any aliases.
Shooter was a left-wing extremist:
This claims was often coupled with claims of the shooter’s identity and motives behind the
shooting, which was perpetuated by a story written by the Gateway Pundit.
→ Danley stated, “Paddock didn’t talk in length about politics and did not belong to any
political organizations. Paddock did express a dislike for the Obama administration and was
happy when President Trump was elected … Paddock did not comment on the topic of gun
control and did not display any racial bias,” (LVMPD, 2018).
Shooter was part of Antifa:
This claim was often coupled with claims of the shooter’s political beliefs and the shooter’s
identity. The misinformation included claims that Antifa and ISIS literature was found in the
hotel room of the shooter.
→ As previously established, ties to any political groups or organizations were not identified.
The only document found was a handwritten note with distance/bullet drop calculations
(LVMPD, 2018).
Shooter was part of an anti-Trump army:
This included reference to the shooter’s alleged political affiliation and a picture of a man
resembling Paddock that was shown at a Bernie Sanders rally in Reno earlier in the year.
→ As previously established, ties to any political groups or organizations were not present.
Shooter chose the venue because there would be many conservatives in the crowd:
This claim was also coupled often with the shooter’s alleged political affiliation and the
assumption that since the Route Harvest Festival is a country festival, many people who are
conservative or Republican would be there
→ Paddock originally booked a room at The Ogden in late September that overlooked the Life Is
Beautiful music festival and, “exhibited behavior which was similar to his time spent at
Mandalay Bay.” The shooter also booked rooms for a hotel during the Lollapalooza music
festival in Chicago in August and had Internet searches that included "biggest open air concert
venues in USA" and "how crowded does Santa Monica Beach get,” in May of 2017 (LVMPD,
2018).
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Shooting was a hoax:
People also started to claim that the shooting was made-up, “fake news,” or an “insider job” as
sometimes claimed the 9/11 terrorist attack (Bell, 2018).
Fake missing people:
Several accounts announced missing friends or relatives that did not exist or were not missing
(Ohlheiser, 2019).
→ It was later found that these accounts lied to get more followers and online attention
(Ohlheiser, 2019).

METHODOLOGY
This study utilizes data from the UNLV Libraries, collected by Thomas Padilla and Miranda Barrie
that includes 14,108,104 tweets created from September 30, 2017 until October 7, 2017 at 5:00
pm PDT. The term “vegas” was used as the criteria for the collection of tweets. A response with
this large number of tweets is significant, as the more typical number of tweets responding to
mass shootings that occurred more recently (like the El Paso or Odessa shootings as examples)
fluctuated around 1 million. This study also utilizes one of the collections conducted by the
author of this paper on the second anniversary of the shooting and includes 437,841 tweets
created from September 27, 2019 until October 6, 2019. Table 2 further describes the data.
These tweets were collected using the open-source command line tool known as Twarc, which
archived the tweets in JSONL format.
Table 2: Summary of Twitter collections pertaining to study
Collection
1-Oct 2017
1-Oct 2019

Search term
vegas
vegas

Start of collection
End of Collection
Sat Sep 30 02:57:03 Tue Oct 07 17:00:00
Fri Sep 27 09:48:32
Sun Oct 06 17:24:17

# of tweets
14,108,104
437,841

Because the topic of misinformation is so expansive, news stories highlighting tweets that
included misinformation in them were used as the starting point to find tweets. Tweets that
contained specific words, phrases, and users pertaining to information pollution were
extracted. Multiple phrases or words can pertain to a topic - for example, the claim that ISIS is
responsible for the shooting can have Twitter entries that include “ISIS,” “ISIL,” “Islamic State.”
Conversely, it is also possible for tweets pertaining to the topic to not include any explicit
mention of said topic and unfortunately the scope of this study is unable to account for those
kind of tweets.
If there were multiple search terms for a single topic, tweets corresponding to each of those
terms would be extracted and grouped together in “clusters” that coincide with the topic. This
also accounts for tweets that contain multiple details of misinformation and/or on different
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topics, such tweets were included in multiple clusters. The list of qualifiers and their
corresponding “clusters” can be seen in greater detail in Appendix A.
After the tweets were sorted in their clusters, any duplicate tweets were removed. A single
tweet is rich in information, containing more than 150 different data variables and for the
scope of this study, the variables of interest (created at, full text, tweet id, user id, username,
location hashtags) were then obtained and used for the analysis. Table 3 goes over the
variables of interest and describes them using the definitions found in the Twitter Developer
dictionary (Twitter). Misinformation is also spread through video and pictures, however this
study will focus on the written misinformation that can be detected from the full text of the
recorded tweet.
Table 3: Description of tweet variables
Variable

Description

Created at

UTC time when this Tweet was created.

Full Text

entire text of the tweet

Tweet ID

unique identifier for this Tweet

User ID

identifier for this User

Screen_name

The screen name, handle, or alias that this user identifies
themselves with. screen_names are unique but subject to change

Location

user-defined location for this account’s profile

Hashtags

hashtags mentioned in the Tweet or Retweet

Since the “location” variable is self-identified, it may not mean that the user is at that indicated
location, but it can signify the place that the user has emotional connections with. There are
other geographical variables like “coordinate” and “place” that give more accurate information,
but do not have many entries within them since it is a feature that the user has to manually
enable. A potential benefit to using “location” is that it allows for the opportunity to identify
the presence of Twitter bots easier, as many bots often have strange entries for their locations
or the same locations across multiple accounts (Barojan, 2018).
Figure 2: General overview of data processing
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DATA AND RESULTS
The tweets for each of the topic were divided in the categories of “Claim” and “Check”. The
“Claim” category which indicates that the entry supported the misinformation or introduced
the Message, therefore instigating the spread information pollution. Tweets attempting to
correct the false information or question the validity of pronounced accusations are sorted
under the “Check” category. These categories are going to be divided and sorted by the same
protocol for the rest of the paper. Note: There is an inherent bias of more entries toward the
“Claim” category since even tweets that contain more neutral messages can be construed as
still supporting the misinformation. Top 10 Hashtags used within each cluster is available in
Appendix B, any key findings from the hashtags will also be depicted here.
There were multiple shooters
Starting with the claims that the shooting was not solely done by Paddock, the engagements
amount to 66,667 of extracted tweets in total. Figure 3 shows the number of tweets per day
throughout the 2017 collection, with the greatest amount of entries recorded the day after the
shooting with 29,977 entries that gradually taper off. No fact checking tweets about this topic
were recognized.
Figure 3: “Multiple shooters” tweets per day
35,000

Figure 4: Tweets from the U.S. vs not

29,977

Number of tweets

30,000
25,000
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The location of the tweets shown in Figure 3 were categorized between domestic vs. foreign
entries to see how localized the conversation is. Foreign interference and meddling in U.S.
domestic policy was another issue that came to limelight during the 2016 election and since the
shooting received international attention, it would be interesting to see if any trends in
“Foreign” participation emerge. Figure 4 shows a pie chart depicting the ratio of tweet entries
originating in the United States vs. other counties with 89% of the entries originating in the
United States. About 984 tweets concerning multiple shooters were recorded in the 2019
collection, many people were still not convinced that there was only one shooter.
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ISIS was responsible for shooting
A total of 216,764 tweets concerned the discussion of this claim. This time, the discussion for
this topic contained fact checking tweets. As can be seen in Figure 5, similar to the “multiple
shooters” discussion, the greatest amount of generated tweets occurred on October 2 nd, 2017.
The number of tweets quickly decreased but had a small recovery of conversations on October
6th, 2017. The fact-checking tweets only amounted to a fourth of the tweets perpetuating the
misinformation and quickly decreased in mentions.
Figure 5: “ISIS responsible” tweets per day
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Figure 6 shows the ratio of tweets located in the U.S. vs. internationally within tweets that
propagate or try to correct the misinformation. There is a greatest share of international
responses that spread misinformation with 23% of the “Claim” responses. While being 11% of
the “Check” responses. No entries were logged in the 2019 collection for this topic.
Figure 6: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets
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Shooter was a Muslim or converted to Islam
A total of 37,913 tweets were recorded for this conversation and included a more divided
discussion that feature more “fact checking” tweets than the previous conversations. AS Figure
7 shows, the greatest number of recoded tweets was again on October 2nd, 2017 where the
topic was widely debated but “fact checking” quickly decreasing within a day.
Figure 7: “Shooter was Muslim” tweets per day
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Figure 8 also shows greater participation from the international community in perpetuating
tweets. While this topic garnered a great response, only 36 entries were recorded in the 2019
collection that still claimed that Paddock was Muslim.
Figure 8: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets
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Since this discussion was so heated, different patterns of hashtag usage also emerged that are
highlighted in a generated word cloud shown in Figure 9 below, created with Jason Davies
Word Cloud Generator. It shows the top 150 hashtags used by those who claim the shooter was
Muslim.
Figure 9: Hashtags used in “Claim” Tweets

Figure 10: Hashtags used in “Check” Tweets
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The hashtags used highlight the different points-of-view of the two sides and what they pay
attention to or value, with Figure 9 showing popular hashtags like #notallmuslims, #MAGA,
#terrorist and Figure 10 showing popular hashtags from the “fact checking” tweets that include
#guncontrolnow, #muslimban, #islamophobia.
“Going to die” warning
This did not have any tweets that qualified as fact checking or questioning the allegations that
the shooter’s girlfriend told concert goers they were going to die. Figure 11 shows a total of
22,449 were extracted with the greatest response being on October 2 nd, 2017 again. This
discussion follows closely with the trends seen with the discussion of multiple shooters.
Figure 11: “Warning” tweets per day
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Figure 12: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets
Figure 12 depicts the share of misinformation
tweets with 89% of them originating from the
United States. Low numbers of tweets concerning
this topic were identified in the 2019 collection,
with 201 entries.
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Shooter’s identity
The false allegations concerning the identity of the shooter amount to 1036 entries, Figure 13
shows that number of tweets that pertained to the topic per day. The greatest number of
tweets were recorded on October 2nd, 2017 and in a rare instance, more “fact checking” tweets
were present however the amount of tweets again quickly decreased the following days while
the allegations increased on October 4th, 2017.
Figure 13: “Shooter’s identity” tweets per day
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Figure 14 shows that there is also a greater participation from other countries on both sides of
the discussion, with 28% of the “Claim” tweets and 48% of the “Check” tweets not originating in
the United States.
Figure 14: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets
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Shooter was part of an anti-Trump army
13,166 tweets were recorded that pertained to the discussion of whether the shooter was
“anti-Trump” and was part of the some militia plotting against Trump. This discussion was often
pairing with the allegation that Paddock belonged to Antifa (that had a discussion spanning
40,933 tweets) but the two topics had a similar trend, so only the anti-Trump discussion will be
highlighted. Figure 15 shows that the greatest response was still seen on October 2nd, 2017
unlike the other discussions, the claims mentioned here did not decrease as quickly after that
initial surge. This topic did not have any tweets trying to fact check and question the discussion.
Figure 15: “Shooter was anti-Trump” tweets per day
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Figure 16: Locations of “Claim” and “Check” Tweets
Figure 16 depicts the location of origin of the tweets
within the discussion and shows that most of the
misinformation is spread within the United States.
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Are humans or bots behind these interactions?
To find some initial results whether the interactions that we are seeing within the discussion
are real or manufactured by automated bots, a web-based program called Hoaxy is used to
search tweets or articles shared on Twitter and visualize the engagement between accounts.
The visualizations also utilized another web-based program called Botometer that analyzes the
accounts and identifies who behaves more human- or bot-like.
The top 20 stories - with articles that include the ISIS, Antifa, fake missing people, FBI cover-up,
and more – were selected and analyzed by Hoaxy. Out of the 989 accounts analyzed, 432
accounts received a Botometer score of 0, meaning that those accounts behave the most
human-like while 15 accounts were given a score of 5, meaning they are most bot-like
(Botometer). Table 4 depicts the entire distribution of scores classified in the search.
Table 4: Distribution of human- and bot-like behavior from accounts citing news articles
Score
Number of
accounts

1
432

2
241

3
172

4
86

5
15

About 11% of the accounts can be considered as highly suspected of being bots (if you count
those with a score of 4 and 5). If you included accounts that have any degree of speculation
that it may be bot, the percentage would then increase to 54%. This would still be less than the
overall average for Twitter, which typically has 66% of the any shared news links come from
suspected bots (Wojcik, 2018).

SUMMARY OF RESULTS
To begin to unravel the complex behavior of the spread of misinformation, tweets containing
mentions of false information (both those who support and question the claims) we extracted
from two Twitter collections concerning the 1 October shooting. The discussion for the most
pervasive rumors were the highest on October 2nd, 2017 the day after the shooting. The
conversations quickly decreased in engagement, within a few days of the shooting as national
attention feigned. The amount of the identified false claims were much higher than the
attempted corrections, with the exception of the discussion about the shooter’s identity, and
the amount of fact checking tweets decreased much steeper than the perpetuation of false
claims. The majority of tweets within each topic were made by people living or having a strong
emotional connection to the United States. Engagement from other countries is typically higher
in conversation that spread the misinformation. Conversations concerning if ISIS was
responsible for the shooting garnered the most attention and had the greatest engagement
compared to the other topics.
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POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS
“People can foresee the future only when it coincides with their own wishes, and the most
grossly obvious facts can be ignored when they are unwelcome,” this statement by George
Orwell can also be applied to the past and the interpretation of any fact that is presented to an
individual (Horton, 2007). Attempting to deal with information disorders is walking a fine line
between having no effect in renegading the dangers of false claims and infringing on the
freedoms of speech and access to information. A recent example of this can be seen with the
Hungarian parliament, which passed legislation that allows for them to prosecute and imprison
any journalist that they deem as spreading “fake news,” (IPI, 2020). Although many Hungarian
independent journalists fear these measures are rather intended to stifle any coverage that is
critical to the government’s handling of the crisis.
The problem is that action taken to regulate mis- and dis-information often results in declining
transparency of information and the confinement of the media – while reverse should occur.
Dealing with misinformation can be analogous to wearing a seatbelt or riding a bike with a
helmet on. Even with regulations emplaced that people must wear their seatbelt, not everyone
does but the first course of action is not to prosecute and imprison them for their disregard of
safety. The following are some recommendations for actors to consider.
Government (Federal, State, and Local)
It is difficult to divulge at which specific level of government action against information
pollution needs to be taken as it can be spread from anywhere in the world, but any action
taken do need to be coordinated across all levels. The government could impose fines on
individuals and organizations that start false information meant to be malicious and harmful.
The identification of such information can be done by an independent agency on a national
level that would be responsible for warning the nation of the false information and providing
evidence of intended harm and falsehood of the content.
The federal government can also create cybersecurity trainings and courses that which would
be publicly available and would teach their citizens how to identify information disorders. Doing
this on a national level is important as state and local governments may not provide the
autonomy needed to effectively instruct individuals. All levels of government can sponsor
programs that aim to continue developing detection programs that can more effectively and
reliably identify false information and fake accounts of social media.
Twitter
The social media platform recently released an update to their site that included labels for
tweets containing potentially manufactured and/or harmful information. Figure 17 shows a
screenshot taken of Twitter’s categorization of how they will treat claims found with different
degrees of severity (Roth and Pickles, 2020).
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Figure 17: Action to be taken by Twitter based by severity of identified claims.

It is also essential to continue to target content that is amplified by automation and develop
tools that are more effective at identifying bot activity. While warnings and labels are
considerable steps forward, it is important to make fact-checking tools more readily available
and popular with users – perhaps even having a tab or button that users that could press on a
tweet or account that then uses open-source programs to identity whether a tweets contains
false claims or a user displays bot-like activity. This also produces engagement with the user
and may even help to stimulate the users into doing more thorough fact-checking and research
into an issue.
Media
Given the partnership that media corporations have with social media outlets, they are a crucial
piece to mitigating misinformation. News organizations often make the mistake of legitimizing
misinformation while reporting on it or giving the warning that information is false (West,
2017). Such was evident within the 1 October collections, with instances where individuals
posted neutral tweets that tried to highlight the false information and unfortunately could
easily be interpreted as supporting the claims. News organizations can also provide outlines
and publicly available access to news literacy curriculum that would teach how to differentiate
between fact and fiction.
Individuals
A revolutionary step that each individual can take is to rethink how they choose to deal with
misinformation that they come across. False information is frequently most successful in
acquiring attention when it targets emotions of fear and anger against another group. Keeping
this in mind and being skeptical of the intentions behind such a post can keep an individual
from impulsively retweeting and legitimizing the message (Kaplan, 2019). The attitudes taken
towards users that perpetuate the claims can also be counter-productive. As a claim is
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introduced and becomes fiercely contested, those who recognize that a claim is false can treat
those who spread the claim with contempt and ridicule. This becomes problematic when you
consider the human propensity for confirmation bias, or a ‘myside bias’ that a person will
defend (even believe in more strongly) if conflicting information and attitudes are introduced
(Kolbert, 2017). What starts as a disagreement escalates into an emotional debate divided
across political ideologies.
Every person can also take matters into their own hands and use open-source programs like
Botometer, Hoaxy, StopFake to check content they find suspicious themselves. While there is a
tendency to go to national coverage of events, individuals can also support local news outlets
and public service media to use their coverage as a check to networks and posts that are geared
to be more political.
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APPENDIX A: Identifiers for clusters

There were multiple shooters: “shooters”
ISIS responsible for shooting: “ISIS,” “Islamic”
Shooter was a Muslim or converted to Islam: “Muslim,” “Islamic”
“Going to die” warning: “going to die,” “Marilou”
Shooter’s identity: “geary,” “sam hyde,” “Al-hajeed”
Shooter was part of Antifa: “Antifa”
Shooter was part of an anti-Trump army: “anti-trump,” “anti trump”

Other Clusters:
Shooters political affiliation and activities: “democrat,” “Bernie Bro,” “liberal,” “leftist,” “leftwing,” “progressive,” “Rachel Maddow,” “October Revolution”
Platforms spreading misinformation: “4chan,” “gateway pundit”
Discussions of misinformation: “fake news,” “rumor,” “without evidence,” “propaganda,”
“troll,” “bot,” “hoax,” “censor,” “algorithm,” “conservative,” “right-wing,” “disinformation,”
“misinformation”

24 | P a g e

APPENDIX B: Top 10 Hashtags used from each discussion

There were multiple shooters
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Claims
Hashtags
#TrueMAGA
#LasVegasShooting
#TellTheTruth
#LasVegas
#ma4t
#VegasShooting
#Vegas
#MandalayBay
#FLASH
#BlueLivesMatter\nPolice

Uses
2753
1987
1584
780
598
556
513
379
377
300

ISIS takes responsibility for shooting
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Claims
Hashtags
#ISIS
#FBI
#LasVegas
#WarRoom
#StephenPaddock
#Veg
#LasVegasShooting
#BREAKING
#Vegas
#AlexJonesShow

Uses
15,716
12,931
6,466
4,675
4,446
3,389
2,968
2,923
2,565
1,787

Checks
Hashtags
#BREAKING
#ISIS
#LasVegas
#FLASH
#Vegas
#UPDATE
#LasVegasShooting
#tcot
#RT
#shooting

Uses
264
147
65
62
55
33
18
13
11
10

Shooter was Muslim
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
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Claims
Hashtags
#lasvegas
#thursdaythoughts
#vegasif
#notallmuslims
#vegas
#guncontrol
#ma4t
#lasvegasshooting

Checks
Uses
1105
652
638
599
405
376
294
216

Hashtags
#shooting
#guncontrolnow
#muslimban
#lasvegas
#vegas
#stephenpaddock
#vegasshooting
#islamophobia

Uses
5963
1013
93
22
17
16
14
13

9 #muslim
10 #lasvegasattack

197
146

#lasvegasshooting
#isis

12
11

“Going to die” warning
Rank

Claims

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Hashtags
#lasvegasshooting
#truemaga
#mariloudanley
#vegas
#lasvegas
#tucker
#hanni
#teamkj
#lasvegasshooter
#tcot

Uses
1423
1153
513
320
149
121
118
61
53
40

Shooter’s Identity
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10

Claims
Hashtags
#MarilouDonley's
#GunControlNow
#NeverTrump
#Vegas
#vegasshooting
#LasVegas
#mandalaybay
#MandalayBay
#BREAKING
#LasVegasShooting

Uses
11
10
8
8
8
7
7
6
5
5

Checks
Hashtags
#LasVegasShootings
#FakeNews
#LasVegasShooting
#Geary
#Trump
#LasVegas
#fake
#Danley
#UniteBlue
#altright

Uses
12
8
7
5
5
4
4
3
3
3

Shooter was part of Antifa
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
26 | P a g e

Claims
Hashtags
#vegas
#antifa
#warroom
#vegasshoot
#lasvegasshooting
#isis
#breaking
#lasvegas

Uses
5533
5029
4452
2188
1709
1127
1036
1036

Checks
Hashtags
#Antifa
#LasVegasShooting
#39
#Conspiracy
#LasVegas
#antifa
#DomesticTerrorism
#ISIS

Uses
11
10
8
5
4
4
3
3

9 #maga
10 #resistance

635
563

#MSM
#StephenPaddock

Shooter was anti-Trump
Rank
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Claims
Hashtags
#StephenPaddock
#LasVagasShooting
#LawAndOrder
#Vegas
#PrayForLasVegas
#ANTIFA
#resistance
#antifa
#LasVegas
#shooting

Uses
1382
351
203
179
148
107
94
90
60
60

3
3

